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LOFTON V. KEARNEY
157 F. SUPP. 2D 1372 (S.D. FLA. 2001)
FACTS
Steven Lofton, Douglas Houghton, Wayne Larue Smith, and Daniel
Skahen ("plaintiffs") are homosexual men who attempted to adopt foster
children in their legal care.' The State of Florida certified Lofton as a foster
parent and entrusted him with the care of three children over a ten-year
period.2 When Lofton applied to adopt one of the children in his care ("John
Doe"), however, the Department of Children and Families ("DCF") rejected
his application based on a Florida adoption provision that prevents
homosexuals from adopting.3 Houghton, after becoming the legal guardian of
a child ("John Roe"), tried to adopt the child when John Roe's father renounced
his parental rights.4 Following a home study evaluation, the interviewers
informed Houghton that his homosexual status would prevent him from filing
a petition to adopt John Roe pursuant to the Florida adoption provision against
adoption by homosexuals.' Smith and Skahen attempted to adopt three foster
children in their care, but the DCF also informed them that their admission on
the adoption application of their homosexuality would bar such attempts.6
The plaintiffs sued defendants, the Secretary of Florida's DCF, Kathleen
Kearney, and the District XI Administrator of Florida's DCF, Charles
Auslander, the individuals responsible for upholding the adoption provision.7
The plaintiffs allege that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment8 protects their fundamental rights to familial privacy, intimate
association and family integrity.9 According to the plaintiffs, the adoption
provision, by impeding upon those rights, violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment." The plaintiffs also claim that the provision's
denial of adoption rights to homosexuals, exclusively, violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Lofton, Smith, and Skahen began the case along with three other plaintiffs
on May 26, 1999, but the court dismissed the other plaintiffs' claims for lack
I. Lofion v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1375-1376 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
2. Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1375.
3. Id. at 1375.
4. Id. at 1375-1376.
5. Id. at 1376.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; (stating that "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law").
9. Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1377.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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of standing.'2 One year later, Lofton, Smith, and Skahenjoined by Houghton,
filed an amended complaint that survived the defendants' motion to dismiss
for lack of standing. 3 After issuing its order to deny the defendants' motion,
the district court stated it would deal with the defendants' motion for summary
judgment.' 4
HOLDING
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida held
that the Florida statute prohibiting adoption by homosexuals did not violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because foster parents do
not have a protected liberty interest to adopt.1 5 Using the rational basis test,
the court also found that the statute is valid under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment because the statute promotes gender role
modeling and minimizes social stigmas, such as societal prejudice from being
raised by homosexuals.' 6 The state has a legitimate interest in shielding the
children from those prejudices as well as providing a stable family
environment with parents of both sexes. 7
ANALYSIS
Writing for the court, Judge King examined whether the plaintiffs had
raised a genuine issue of material fact to defeat the summary judgment motion
made by the defendants. 8 If there is no issue of fact for a reasonable jury to
decide upon, then the defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.' 9 The plaintiffs allege that the adoption provision violates the Due
Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. In order for the plaintiffs
to prevail, the plaintiffs must show that at least one of the claims raises a fact
for the jury to consider.2
The court evaluated the plaintiffs' due process claim in terms of
fundamental rights that, while not explicitly stated in the Bill of Rights, are
12. Id. at 1376-1377.
13. Id. at 1377.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1380.
16. Id. at 1381-1383.
17. Id. at 1383.
18. Id at 1377-1378.
19. Id. at 1378; FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1).
20. Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d. at 1377.
21. Id. at 1378.
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implicit in historical traditions and common notions of liberty and justice.22
The Supreme Court says that there is a protected liberty interest in how parents
decide to raise their children.23 While fundamental liberty interests of the
family sustain the rights of parents, the court did not recognize the same rights
associated with foster parents.24 The Supreme Court has stated that foster
parents do not have a constitutionally protected right because the state creates
their parent-child relationship; thus, there is no justifiable expectation that the
family unit will continue to exist.25 The plaintiffs understood that the
relationship was subject to state approval. 26 Notwithstanding the emotional
support and medical care given by the men to the children, the Court did not
acknowledge that a permanent relationship exists among the plaintiffs. 27 Thus,
once the plaintiffs conceded the foster status there was no question as to the
nature of the relationship.
28
The court evaluates equal protection claims by using three standards of
review. 29 The court has established various criteria for determining which
standard applies to each situation based upon the classification of the
individual or group involved.3" Under strict scrutiny analysis, which is the
highest standard of review, the government must show that the law is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that the law is narrowly
tailored to protect that interest.3" This standard only applies to an individual
or a group that is part of a suspect class, such as race or alienage or if there has
been a violation of a fundamental right.32 The rationale of the strict scrutiny
standard is that a violation of a right to a member of a suspect class will not be
tolerated and therefore any government action interfering with those rights
must be evaluated rigorously.33
When a statute or other government action involves a quasi-suspect class,
such as gender or illegitimacy, the court invokes the intermediate scrutiny
standard.34 The intermediate scrutiny standard states that the law must be
substantially related to an important government interest.35 This standard of
22. Id. (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
23. Id. (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (stating that mother has due process right to
decide visitation of her children)).
24. Id. at 1379.
25. Id.(citing Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977)).
26. Id. at 1380.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1381-1382.
29. Id.
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review is not the same heightened analysis required under strict scrutiny;
rather intermediate scrutiny analysis usually finds the governmental interest
insufficient and invalidates the law under review, especially in the instance of
a statute that burdens or stereotypes women. 6
Rational basis review is the least restrictive of the equal protection
standards.37 If the state action is rationally related to a legitimate state interest,
then the court will generally uphold the statute.3" Under this standard the
government can suggest any interest, as long as it is not arbitrary, that the law
purports to address and the court will most likely uphold the statute.39
Using the rational basis test, the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed
to assert an equal protection claim.4" The plaintiffs did not fall within the
suspect class as recognized by the Supreme Court and the court declined to use
strict scrutiny because it determined that the plaintiffs had no fundamental
rights as foster parents and legal guardians.4 The plaintiffs contend that the
adoption provision should be analyzed under the strict scrutiny test or at least
the intermediate scrutiny test.42 The Supreme Court decided not to view
homosexuals as a suspect or quasi-suspect group and instead applied the
rational basis test to decide the equal protection claim.43 The Supreme Court
had previously used the rational basis test to evaluate the classification of
homosexual.'
The court stated that under the rational basis test, the adoption provision
will be upheld if the provision is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.45 Under this test the presumption is in favor of upholding the
provision, so the burden rests with the plaintiff to invalidate any rational
reason for the provision.46 The defendants asserted two reasons behind the
adoption provision.47 The court dismissed the state's interest in registering the
moral disapproval of homosexuals as a legitimate reason for the adoption
provision.48 The state also asserted that in order to serve the best interests of
the children homosexuals should not be allowed to adopt.49 Despite the
36. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
37. Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1381.
38. Id.
39. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483 (1995).
40. Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1381.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1381-1382.





49. Id. at 1383.
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plaintiffs' allegations that the state's legitimate government interest is a pretext
for an underlying motive, the court held that the possible motive is irrelevant
as long as a reasonable and legitimate state interest exists.5" The court also
found relevant the plaintiffs' failure to disagree with the state's second
assertion.5 The plaintiffs failed to offer any evidence that a homosexual
family environment would provide the same stable home and proper gender
roles that a married heterosexual family provides leaving the court with no
option other than to find the state's assertion valid.52
The court upheld the adoption provision because the state had a legitimate
interest in barring homosexual adoption.53 In concluding that the plaintiffs
also failed to assert a genuine issue of material fact, the court granted the
defendants' summary judgment motion.54
CONCLUSION
By using the rational basis review standard, the court condemned the
plaintiffs to fail on their equal protection claim. In most cases using this
standard, the court defers to the government's reasons to justify the state action
and finds that the government action is legitimate and rationally related to the
purposes behind that action.55 Almost any reason will serve to uphold the
government action under the rational basis standard.
While the court may have been correct in holding that the plaintiffs failed
to demonstrate a fundamental right under a due process claim, the equal
protection holding is less defensible. As homosexuals, the plaintiffs are
specifically targeted and denied a right to adopt based only upon their
homosexual orientation. In equal protection cases where there is a history of
discrimination against a class, such as race, the court recognizes that
distinction as warranting heightened scrutiny of state action.56 The Supreme
Court has yet to classify homosexuals as a quasi-suspect or suspect class
deserving heightened scrutiny.57
It has been asserted that sexual orientation is deserving of a heightened
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1383-1384.
52. Id
53. Id. at 1384.
54. Id.
55. Williamson v. Lee Optical ofOklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1995); FCC v. Beach Communications,
Inc., 507 U.S. 307 (1993); Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Heller v. Doe
by Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993).
56. Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pa., Inc. v. Philadelphia, 91 F.3d 586, 606 (3rd Cir. 1996);
Anderson v. State Univ. ofN.Y., 107 F. Supp. 2d 158, 161 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
57. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
2002]
Wash. & Lee Race & Ethnic Anc. L.J.
scrutiny analysis on the grounds that discrimination of gays, lesbians and
bisexuals is another form of sexual discrimination.58 The sex discrimination
argument states that "laWs which discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation constitute a form of sexual discrimination."59  Laws, such as
sodomy, that prohibit particular sexual behavior between members of the same
sex, are permitted between members of the opposite sex.6" Unfortunately, the
dual method of interpreting the statutes involving classifications based on
sexual orientation, either as statutes which treat men and women equally or as
statutes that treat men and women differently, weakens the sex discrimination
argument.6' The opponents of the sex discrimination argument can use the
interpretation that the statutes treat men and women equally to defeat claims
of sex discrimination.62 Although the argument is not a strong one in the fight
for lesbian and gay rights, it does hope'to convince courts to end the rational
basis review of laws implicating sexual orientation and to apply the same
heightened scrutiny as in cases involving gender discrimination.63
Advocates of the sex discrimination argument analogize the argument to
the case of Loving v. Virginia,' where the Supreme Court held a statute that
prohibited men and women of different races from marrying as
unconstitutional.65 This application of Loving to the sexual discrimination
argument suggests that the same analysis applied in Loving can be applied to
sexual orientation.66 In Loving, the state of Virginia argued that the statute
applied equally to individuals of all races and therefore did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause.67 The Court explained that the distinctions made in
the statute based upon race need to be justified by a compelling government
interest, which Virginia failed to accomplish. 68 The Loving analogy supports
the argument that the mere equal application of a statute is not enough to avoid
violating the Equal Protection Clause.69 The analogy also helps to support the
argument for likening sexual orientation to a suspect or quasi-suspect class
deserving heightened scrutiny. Unfortunately, until the courts recognize
sexual orientation as a suspect class, the courts will use only the rational basis
58. Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 49
UCLA L. REv. 471,472 (2001).
59. Id. at 472.
60. Id. at 487.
61. Id. at 490.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 487-488.
64. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
65. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
66. Stein, supra note 58, at 491.
67. Id.




standard to analyze this type of discrimination.:
An unfortunate consequence of this decision is a message to government
that any action taken against homosexuals will be upheld under equal
protection standards as long as the government provides some legitimate
reason that rationally relates to the state action. Upholding discriminatory
state action only perpetuates the stereotypes associated with homosexuals and
makes it more difficult for homosexuals to be treated equally.
The decision also reaffirms the State of Florida's family values argument
that homosexuals cannot provide the proper environment in which to raise
children.7" The plaintiffs clearly demonstrated that they provided a loving and
nurturing home for the children;7 so it seems unfair to deny these children the
opportunity to be in an environment that is equally within the state's interest
to provide, just because of the foster parents' sexual orientation. Many
children with medical problems or psychological scars are living without a
stable home. These same children are often unwanted because of those
problems. Should we deny these children the opportunity to live in a safe,
loving home because the people who would like to care for them don't
comport with our traditional notions of a family? There are many non-
traditional families in existence: single mothers and fathers, grandparents
raising grandchildren, older siblings raising younger siblings. The only
difference between these examples and the plaintiffs in this case are that the
plaintiffs' version of a non-traditional family involves a controversial issue.
The State of Florida is unwilling to accept this new form of non-traditional
family because it does not coincide with what the State believes is in the best
interest of the children. The State should reevaluate which interest is more
important to uphold, a loving, supportive home or one free of social stigmas.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Journt N. Shaw
70. Lofton, 157 F. Supp. 2dat 1383.
71. Id. at 1375-1376.
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